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MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREmE COURT 1862-1890. By Charles
Fairman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. vii, 456.
Let no one be misled. Supreme Court justices are not alone jurists;
they are statesmen as well. And this is necessarily so, for, as the present
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has poignantly expressed, "the process of con-
stitutional interpretation compels the translation of policy into judgment,
and the controlling conceptions of the justices are their 'idealized political
picture' of the existing social order." It is then because the American
system of constitutional limitations calls for a peculiar type of judicial
statesmanship that the experience, environment, fears and imaginations
of justices become the signposts along the road leading to an intelligent
understanding of particular pronouncements of these men.
From time to time inquiring scholars have canvassed the lives and
times of certain justices whose careers are said to have been outstanding
and so have given us a rich insight into their professional activities. But
the lives and times of those whose days on the Court have been draped in
less popular glory have too often remained unknown. Samuel Freeman
Miller may not have enjoyed the leadership of Marshall nor the scholar-
ship of Holmes, but his role in the history of the Court is not of little
significance. Indeed, it was he to whom Chief Justice Chase referred as
"the dominant personality [then] upon the bench, whose mental force and
individuality [were] felt by the Court more than any other." Our attention
may well be focused upon one who wielded so great an influence on the
Court. To Mr. Fairman we are indebted for having given us a remarkable
insight into and a definite treatment of Mr. Justice Miller and his time;
a treatment based upon a careful investigation of an impressive width of
material.
Happily, the book is "less a biography than a study of a distinct period
in the annals of the Court."' Biographical references are incident and
subordinate to the more significant chronicle of his times. Owing to Miller's
full life and buoyant personality these biographical references serve well
as the fulcrum for an exposition of the judicial history of a period when
the forces of nationalism released by the Civil War produced a variety bf
new constitutional issues; a period during which the influences of the
Court were still formative and when the destiny of a divided nation was
being welded.
Miller's penchant for law was a belated one. In his youth he studied
medicine but his chief interest seems to have been debating fellow-towns-
men in a small Kentucky lyceum at a time when he was still untempered
by responsibility and not yet disillusioned by experience. An active emanci-
pationist, Miller gave expression to his antipathy for slavery by leaving
Kentucky in 1849, after having satisfied himself that slavery would never
be voluntarily abolished in a slave state, and departed for what was then
1. P. v.
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classed as the Northwest. Settling in Keokuk, Iowa, he soon adapted him-
self to the Iowa practice and before long attracted the attention of the
local bar. To the extent that his professional activities permitted, Miller
aligned himself with the Republican party. As an outstanding leader in
the state, the course of political development seemed to call him to some
public employment. But his activities were essentially local and his fame
not widespread. Indeed, when President Lincoln sent to the Senate his
nomination as an associate justice, the New York Tribune stated: "Mr.
Miller's name is printed Samuel in the despatches, but we presume it is
Daniel F. Miller, the first Whig member of Congress ever chosen from
Iowa."
Miller had no false modesty. His appointment to the Court cannot be
said to have been unsolicited. Miller's desire to wield public power, self-
assurance in the soundness of his principles, personal ambition and zeal
for the common good found in him a happy combination. To induce Presi-
dent Lincoln to appoint Miller, it was first necessary to enlist the active
support of the senators and representatives of Iowa, the state bar, the
governor and the state legislature. And Miller, himself, went to Washing-
ton to see that nothing was left undone. The most important barrier to
his appointment was the then pending judiciary bill, for, if Miller was to
be appointed, it was essential to cause the four trans-Mississippi states,
Missouri, Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota, to be grouped in the Ninth
Circuit Largely due to the efforts of Representative James F. Wilson,
of Iowa, Congress accepted this division of judicial districts and Miller's
appointment was made possible. In terms of present day canons of conduct,
Miller's efforts in behalf of his appointment appear to have been in poor
taste, to say the least, but judged in light of the customs of the day it did
not represent a departure from accepted practice. At any rate his appoint-
ment was confirmed within a half hour after its submission to the Senate
and without reference to a committee.
Miller retained the same sentiments toward the Court as virtually every
other mid-western Republican of the time; sentiments which are epitomized
by a statement in the "home town" newspaper greeting his appointment:
"He is the model the beau ideal of a Western Lawyer and a Western Judge,
and his advent to the bench cannot fail to create a sensation even in that
fossilized circle of venerable antiquities which constitutes the Bench of the
Supreme Court of the United States." Whatever Miller's own sentiments
toward the justices were, once on the Court he succeeded in maintaining
good personal relations with his colleagues, and his pleasant manner sur-
vived the acrimony of the conference room. He lived to command the en-
comiums of his fellow justices.
While a member of the Court, Miller was called upon to participate in
decisions where the issues involved touched the nerve center of our economic
and social life. Here his commendable candor provokes a vividness of treat-
ment. Fully aware that it was not the duty of a Supreme Court justice
to be an architect of policy, he was never anxious to draw from the un-
certain contours of vague constitutional language finicky limitations as a
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss1/7
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means of circumscribing the discretion of Congress. 2 And so in the case
of Davidson v. New Orleans we find him saying: "If this is not due process
of law, it ought to be." His treatment of cases arising under the commerce
clause gives a revealing insight into his understanding of the extent of the
authority of Congress over the subject. In Crandall v. Nevada4 he spoke
for the Court in holding that the state may not impose a tax on persons
leaving its borders; he spoke for the Court in an instance where the visa
of the judiciary was given to Congress' exclusive control over immigration;5
and he again spoke for the Court in the important case of Wabash, St. L.
and Pac. Ry. v. Illinois6 holding that the matter of interstate shipments
required exclusive national regulation. A few months later, the Interstate
Commerce Act was passed. His position in the Legal Tender Cases7 has
recently been cited with approvals
Miller's judicial acumen was not confined to public law matters. His
dictum in Nichols v. Eaton9 is considered by an outstanding authority to
have been "the greatest single factor in the development of spendthrift
trusts"1 (but he died intestate!). In the field of criminal law his dislike
for capital punishment often caused him to search for constitutional
grounds for setting aside a sentence of death.' 1 His opinions in cases in-
volving ecclesiastical disputes, where he steadfastly held that such matters
were not properly for the decision of a civil tribunal, are examples of
what is now referred to as judicial self-restraint.'2
Following the death of Chief Justice Chase in 1873 there was much
popular support for Miller to succeed him. But President Grant was in-
clined to quite a different and characteristic choice. President Grant first
offered the appointment to Senator Roscoe Conklin, one of undoubted in-
telligence but with questionable professional qualifications. The President
then nominated Attorney General Williams, but he was unacceptable to
the Senate and so the nomination was withdrawn. Then the nomination
of Caleb Cushing was sent to the Senate. This nomination met with uni-
versal disapprobation. Miller, who regarded himself as the spontaneous
choice of the bar and is revealed to have resented the President's failure
to appoint him to the Chief Justiceship did not permit his personal dis-
appointment to prompt him to foster actively the rejection of Attorney
General Williams. Perhaps this was because, as he wrote, "Williams was
2. See In re Neagle (1890) 185 U. S. 1; Ex parte Yarbrough (1884)
110 U. S. 651; United States v. Kagama (1886) 118 U. S. 375.
3. (1877) 96 U. S. 97, 100.
4. (U. S. 1868) 6 Wall. 35.
5. Henderson v. Mayor of New York (1876) 92 U. S. 259; The Head
Money Cases (1884) 112 U. S. 580.
6. (1886) 118 U. S. 557.
7. Knox v. Lee (U. S. 1871) 12 Wall. 457; see particularly his dissenting
opinion in Trebilcock v. Wilson (U. S. 1872) 12 Wall. 687.
8. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. (1935) 294 U. S. 240.
9. (1875) 91 U. S. 716.
10. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts (1936) 25.
11. Kring v. Missouri (1882) 107 U. S. 221; Ex parte Medley (1890)
134 U. S. 160.
12. Watson v. Jones (1872) 13 Wall. 679.
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an old Keokuk friend" and because Miller had reason to believe that Wil-
liams was of a docile character and that he would be amenable to Miller's
influence. But the Cushing appointment was quite a different matter.
Miller knew that Cushing possessed a strong and independent mind. Though
the Washington Chronicle took the lead in opposing Cushing's nomination,
Miller, though not sympathetic with this scurrilous newspaper attack, was
not an unwilling participant in the successful movement to prevent Cush-
ing's confirmation. Finally, the President nominated Morris A. Waite, of
Ohio, and a grateful Senate gave its confirmation. Professor Fairman
writes that, "In the form of his [Miller's] own conscience he suffered no
condemnation" for his part in the Cushing affair. It must be said that
Miller's pursuits were in the direction of what he regarded to be right
without regard to whether such pursuits would be subjected to miscon-
struction and criticism.
Much of Miller's candor in his opinions only foreshadows his true feel-
ings, which he expresses with less restraint in the greater freedom of pri-
vate correspondence. In Gelp ke v. Dubuque,13 he expresses his antipathy
for the "gambling stockbroker of Wall Street" who "buys at twenty-five
per cent of their value" municipal bonds of doubtful validity, and regrets
that the decision of the majority is likely to facilitate the operations of
rich corporations * * * or rich men making contracts with the legislatures"
in effecting their antisocial ends. In the same term of court14 he speaks
of a decision of his brethren as having been arrived at by a "stretch of
fancy, only to be indulged in railroad bond cases." In a private corre-
spondence he wrote:
I have met with but few things of a character affecting the
public good of the whole country that has shaken my faith in human
nature as much as the united, vigorous, and selfish effort of the capi-
talists,-the class of men who as a distinct class are but recently
known in this country-I mean those who live solely by interest and
dividends. Prior to the late war they were not numerous. They had
no interest separate from the balance of the community, because they
could lend their money safely and at high rates of interest. But one
of the effects of the war was greatly to reduce the rate of interest by
reason of the great increase in the quantity of the circulating medium.
Another was by the creation of a national funded debt, e.xempt from
taxation to provide a means for the investment of surplus capital.
This resource for investment was quadrupled by the bonds issued by
the States, by municipal corporations, and by Rail Road companies.
The result has been the gradual formation of a new kind of wealth
in this country, the income of which is the coupons of interest and
stock dividends, and of a class whose only interest or stake in the
country is the ownership of these bonds and stocks. They engage in
no commerce, no trade, no manufactures, no agriculture. They pro-
dues nothing.'5
May one hazard an expression as to how Miller would have reacted to
such laws as the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Social Security Act?
13. (1864) 1 Wall. 175, 214.
14. Meyer v. Muscatine (1864) 1 Wall. 384, 397.
15. Letter of April 28, 1878.
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One is reluctant to attribute to any justice of the Court all the convic-
tions and intellectual facility of Justice Holmes about the unwisdom of
attempting, by judicial omniscience, "to save society from its own mistakes."
Yet it is true that Miller refused, in sustaining legislation, to indulge, as
did Holmes later, in fictions and apologetic phrases "to beautify what is
[was] disagreeable to the sufferers."'1
Miller was plain-spoken. We are told that of all of the justices on the
Court, Miller was least out of sympathy with the course of congressional
reconstruction, although in voting to sustain the radical legislation he did
not for one moment think that it was wise. In fact, in private correspon-
dence he clearly indicates his disapproval of the course of legislation which,
as a judge, he refused to strike down. In the Slaughter-House decision 17
he succinctly stated that he regarded the police power as being inalienable,
and though he was a little hasty in Loan Association v. Topeka,'5 to speak
in a jargon strangely familiar to that oft-found in due process cases, it
must be said that he would today be surprised to learn that the "natural
rights" of which he was solicitous in the Slaughter-House Cases have since
been grafted to the due process clause where they now flourish in riotous
profusion.
Miller took a legitimate and vitalizing pride in his efforts for the re-
form of the judiciary. Deserved mention must be made of Miller's increas-
ing efforts in connection with the establishment of federal circuit courts
of appeals. In the press of business after the Civil War, the Supreme
Court could not keep pace with its docket and the requirement of "going
on circuit" prevented the lengthening of the Court's term at Washington.
More and more "going on circuit" was proving an onerous and burdensome
task. Miller had urged legislation to curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and had urged the establishment of the circuit courts. Some of his
reforms were realized by the Act of February 16, 1875. However, adequate
relief for the Court, through the creation of intermediate appellate tribu-
nals, was not achieved until after Miller's death, by the Circuit Courts of
Appeals Act of 1891.
So Miller went about his circuit till the last. Interestingly enough for
readers of the LAw QUARTERLY, three days before his death Miller held
his last circuit court at St. Louis in October, 1890. It is said that he was a
favorite of the St. Louis Bar. More local interest is found in mention of the
names of Samuel Miller Breckenridge and Henry Hitchcock as candidates
for the position of associate justice left vacant by Justice Davis' acceptance
of an appointment to the Senate.' 9 It is also interesting to find that Miller's
impatience with narrow-visioned opposition, which sprang from his confi-
dence of his intellectual processes and from his ambitions to see his con-
16. Holmes, J., in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton (1927) 273 U. S. 418, 446.
17. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co. (1884) 111 U. S. 746.
18. (1874) 20 Wall. 655.
19. Neither of these St. Louisans was successful. Miller's tireless en-
deavour to get his brother-in-law, William P. Ballinger, appointed to the
Court also failed to succeed. The appointment was given to John M. Harlan
of Kentucky.
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clusions materialize, is well expressed in letters to Judge Samuel Treat of
St. Louis; these letters are generously sprinkled through the pages of the
book. It is a credit to Miller as a judge that he wasted no time and
allowed the bar to waste none. A colloquy between Miller and a St. Louis
attorney is reported as follows:
"Damn it, Brown, come to the pointl"
"What point, your Honor?"
"I don't know; any point; some point."
It is fair to say that no judge was more patient until he had been put in
full possession of all the facts and considerations pertaining to the case in
hand; but when he was certain of these he did not allow the time of the
court to be consumed in useless and immaterial discussion.20
Miller's life was full of incident and color, and Professor Fairman has
presented a treatment, the impact of which is not small. Reading this
book is well worth while. Professor Fairman has forced us willingly into
his debt; he has presented an interesting and commendable treatise of the
judicial history of that vital period of 1862-1890 when new problems which
pressed for new solutions sprang forth with hopeless abandon.
WALTER FREEDMAX.t
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES. By Leon Green. Second edition.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1939. Pp. xxi, 1356.
About a dozen years ago Dean Green, then a member of the Yale Law
faculty, wrote a monogram of book length entitled The Rationale of Proxi-
mate Cause. Besides being an extraordinarily skillful piece of writing, the
work was boldly iconoclastic. It challenged one of the supreme idols in the
House of Torts-the idol of proximate cause. It asserted that the fetish
was a misnomer to begin with: the invocation of proximate cause in nine
out of ten cases was not for the purpose of resolving the question of causa-
tion, as was currently supposed, but rather to determine fundamental issues
of legal liability that had nothing whatever to do with the matter of causa-
tion. These issues, obviously not issues of fact such as a jury is theoretically
called upon to decide, were peculiarly within the province of the court and
demanded the exercise of the highest function of the judge. To submit
them to the jury under the guise of proximate cause was not only to con-
fuse the real and ordinarily uncomplicated issue of causation (normally
determined quite easily by the "but for" test: "Would the plaintiff have
sustained the damage if the defendant had not done what he did?"), but,
even worse, to obliterate the important distinction between the proper func-
tions of judge and jury. In order to preserve that distinction intelligently
and practically, Dean Green suggested a new method of analysis for deter-
mining tort liability in cases where the chief problem was that which was
currently concealed under the phrase proximate cause, and as an aid in
the handling of that analysis he offered a novel pattern for the classifica-
tion of tort cases.'
20. See editorial in Central Law Journal of July, 1877.
f Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. Green, Judge and Jury (1930) c. 1.
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